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  Groups of men braving the unexpected pounding were met with showers of smaller shots and javelins from the ramparts. No force could surmount forty-foot walls without siege- machines while the heights were manned. Neither the pro­fessional centurions nor the triarii, placed to steady the younger troops, can have failed to observe the futility of the assault when the Carthaginians stood their ground.

  Carrying their wounded, the legions of Manilius pulled back to encamp, with some humiliation, on the isthmus.

  Censorinus directed his own attack against the water- bounded wall which encircled Carthage on her other fronts. Though in itself less forbidding than the triple landward bar­rier, this gained defensively from the paucity of ground (in some places there was almost none) on which an enemy could manoeuvre between beach and fortification. Censorinus in fact chose the only region with any tactical elbow-room.

  At the southeastern point of the city, near the outlet of the harbours to the bay of Kram, a tongue of land protruded out­side the wall toward what is now Goletta (Halk el Wad), at the mouth of the channel to Tunis. This tongue, washed on one side by the sea, on the other by the lake of Tunis, was known to the Romans as the taenia, the ribbon. It provided an ad­equate, though not generous, beach-head from which Cen­sorinus could hammer a relatively weak portion of the wall: a portion, moreover, adjacent to the Byrsa, the city's heart.

  Even so, he fared no better in attack than Manilius. Again, a storm of missiles struck the Romans, while the citizen de­fenders rallied fiercely to the sector. Like his fellow general, Censorinus had to draw off and lick his wounds. Notice had been served by their opponents that Carthage intended to die hard. It was frustrating for the consuls, even abashing, but less than devastating. The remedy clearly lay in assault- machines, invaluable adjuncts of siege war.

  The Romans had confiscated many at the time of the city's disarming, but they were cumbersome vehicles and the consuls had elected to march 'light.' They now sought timber with which to make good their needs. There were woods beyond the lake of Tunis, and Censorinus sent working-parties to fetch supplies. Tempting prey for the roving Himilco Phameas and his horsemen, the Roman gangs succeeded in their quest at a painful cost. At least one was severely mauled. But Censorinus got his timber, and machines were constructed. They included two massive battering de­vices, one of which, according to Appian, was operated and escorted by 6,000 men.

  The next snag was the marshy bank of the lake beside the taenia, where the wall was weakest and most vulnerable to at­tack. Laboriously, the Romans packed the ground with stones and firm soil until it was possible to bring the battering-rams to bear in the area. The great engines quickly pounded a breach in the defences, but the Carthaginians, swarming to the danger- spot, repaired the wall overnight. In a sudden foray, they also disabled the siege-machines.

  Censorinus, provoked by such audacity, replied by thrusting assault troops through a gap which remained in the damaged wall. The attackers, quickly in difficulty and obliged to with­draw through the narrow exit, owed their escape to a covering action inspired by a young officer soon to rise to prom­inence - the Scipio Aemilianus noted during the war with Numidia which he witnessed during his trip to buy ele­phants.

  It was now July and the Romans were uncomfortably aware that they were in Africa. Censorinus, camped by the swampy banks of the lagoon, began to lose troops to heat and pestilence. Transferring his men and ships from the fetid waters of the lake to the sea coast across the taenia, he encountered more trouble. Familiar with the currents and prevailing winds, the Carthaginians prepared fire-ships in the safety of the bay of Kram then released them to drift to the consul's anchorage. Appian alleged the near-destruction of the Roman fleet.

  Plainly, the straightforward reduction of Carthage as en­visaged by the aggressors was going wrong. Each day, more weapons flowed from the Punic forges. Emboldened, the de­fenders dared to sally intrepidly beyond their walls. Himilco menaced the Roman supplies with his cavalry. A review of strategy had become urgent in the consuls' camp.One striking omission in Roman plans had been the neglect of Masinissa, a vital ally at Zama and more recently the scourge of Hasdrubal's army. In their confidence, the consuls had dis­missed the Numidian. 'When we need you, we'll let you know,' he had been told.

  Not that the old King was eager to take sides. For years he had dreamed of Carthage as his own prize; now Rome meant to rob him of that dream. With Carthage gone, the usefulness of Masinissa to Rome would have gone, too. If the Romans could smash the Punic empire, certainly they could have their way with a Numidian state isolated in North Africa. Resent­fully, Masinissa brooded at Cirta.

  One reason his importance was now recognized by the in­vaders was their growing concern with Hasdrubal. While Carthage had been thought to fall like a ripe plumb, the Punic troops of the interior had seemed of little consequence. Their collapse would follow that of the metropolis. But the city's resistance had altered their significance.

  Based on Nepheris, about eighteen miles south of Carthage, Hasdrubal not only bestrode lines of communication crucial in a long siege, but was a disconcerting force behind the Roman camps. Numerically he lacked the power to intervene directly. His raiding capability, however, was considerable, particularly as expressed by the horsemen led by Himilco. Against these swooping riders the Romans had no answer - except to enlist the aid of Masinissa's cavalry.

  The conclusions were twofold. The snubbed Numidian would have to be approached for assistance, and Hasdrubal would have to be neutralized: the second flowing, ideally from the first. An obvious ambassador to the old king existed at the Roman camp in the person of Scipio Aemilianus. Masinissa held the memory of his ally 'Africanus' in great respect. Even an adopted member of the Scipionic family could expect to be honoured at Cirta.

  But Manilius was impatient. Left in sole command of the siege for the winter while Censorinus returned to Rome for the annual elections, the remaining consul resolved to march on Nepheris without waiting for Numidian assistance. It was perilous. Hasdrubal was a rugged and experienced comman­der, none the less formidable for having learned a painful lesson from Masinissa. He knew the territory intimately; his troops were campaign veterans; his cavalry was menac­ing.

  While compelled by Roman numbers to avoid a set-piece battle, Hasdrubal might severely embarrass his foes in wild country. And so it happened.

  At this stage, the reputation of Scipio Aemilianus takes heroic flight. Remembering that in Polybius he had the out­standing historian of the day as a close friend, it is wise to recognize an element of propaganda in the exploits recounted of the young tribune. At face value, he appears to have up­held the Roman campaign almost single-handed for several months.

  Thus, Scipio is credited with disapproving of his superior's plan; with rescuing Manilius and his army from disaster on the futile Nepheris enterprise; with saving four cohorts from massacre on the withdrawal; with persuading Hasdrubal to give decent burial to the Roman dead. Polybius quotes Homer to describe his hero: 'he alone is flesh and blood, the rest are fleeting shadows.'

  Improbably, the words are put into the mouth of Cato, an inveterate opponent of Hellenist and Scipionic modes of life. Yet, if some scepticism is valid, Scipio clearly justified a grow­ing reputation.

  Leaving soon for Numidia, he arrived at Cirta to find Masinissa dead and the old king's very different sons faced with resolving the succession. It was said that he solved the problem with consummate finesse. At Scipio's suggestion, Micipsa, the oldest of three legitimate sons to have survived, 'a lover of peace,' took charge of the palace and Cirta. The youngest, Mastanubal, a student of law, was assigned the post of justice. The middle son, Gulussa, a warlike prince, was given charge of foreign policy.

  With Gulussa's goodwill, Scipio indeed gained a political trump in what was emerging as a bid for control of the whole campaign. Confronting Himilco Phameas with the dual pros­pects of Numidian intervention and a substantial bribe, Scipio now induced the cavalry leader to dese
rt Hasdrubal. It was the nearest thing to a Roman triumph since the advance on Carthage, and, in 148, Scipio left for Rome with the Punic defector to make the most of it.

  25: Scipio in Command

  The chief source for the Third Punic War is Appian, a writer who not only lived much later than the event but whose im­pression of the world was sufficiently eccentric to place Britain half a day by galley from Spain, and the gulf of Valencia north of the Ebro. Fortunately, Appian's description of the fall of Carthage draws heavily on the lost original by Polybius, an historian of distinction and a witness of the climatic scenes.

  Polybius, invaluable to students of Carthage, was a Greek of Megalopolis, in Arcadia. Carried to Rome with a number of suspect Achaeans after the conquest of Macedonia in 168, he formed a close relationship with the victorious Aemilius Paullus and his family, not least the youngest son, Scipio.

  Like Thucydides, whose rationalist principles he echoed, Polybius was rare among the ancients for his scientific con­ception of history, eschewing the legendary traditions of the age. 'In history,' he wrote, 'the end is by real facts and real speeches to instruct and persuade for all time the lovers of knowledge.' He was exceptional, too, for a comprehensive or synoptic view. Thus:

  History is, as it were, an organic whole; the affairs of Italy and Africa are intertwined with those of Asia and Greece, and all have reference to one end.

  No man is impartial, and Polybius did not claim to be. Historians, he asserted, should avoid intentionally falsifying facts to favour nations or friends, but they might, he allowed, 'incline the balance.' That Polybius inclined the balance in favour of the Scipionic cause was a small and human price imposed on posterity for the nearest thing it possesses to a clear description of Carthage and her last defence.

  The extent to which the Roman family confided in the Greek historian is suggested by a conversation between Polybius and Scipio when the latter was eighteen and burdened with his heritage. 'They consider me unambitious and idle’ complained the youth of his compatriots, 'entirely untypical of a Roman. My family, they say, needs a leader quite the opposite of my­self. It distresses me.'

  Reassuringly, Polybius promised guidance 'to help you speak and act worthily.' How much Scipio owed to his mentor is uncertain - perhaps less than the teacher liked to think - but there is no doubt that his remarkable progress to high com­mand was accompanied by a real affection for Polybius.

  The campaign season of 148 proved depressing for the Romans.

  In several ways the Carthaginians were encouraged in their brave defence. With Scipio elsewhere, the sons of Masinissa showed little eagerness to help the invaders; indeed, some Numidian cavalry joined the Carthaginians. While Hasdrubal contrived to get supplies to the city, messengers slipped out to establish ties with distant allies - the Moors beyond Numidia, and the Macedonia pretender Andriscus, then in arms against the Romans. Diplomatic initiatives brought little prac­tical assistance, but helped to keep up morale.

  Spirits in the Roman camp were at low ebb. The men had come for easy victory; stayed to get their heads drubbed. The new generals for the year, the consul Calpurnius Piso and his legate Mancinus, appear to have shrunk from asking much of their unhappy troops. Either circumspectly or pusillanimously - perhaps both - the commanders refrained from directing fresh attacks against the city, marching instead on such lesser places still loyal to Carthage as Clupea and Neapolis.

  Aimless, desultory, the campaign promised little and, stra­tegically, achieved less. Neapolis, at the base of the Cap Bon peninsula, surrendered, but its merciless sacking by the Romans only stiffened resistance elsewhere. Hippo Acra defended her­self so fiercely that the besiegers withdrew empty-handed. It is difficult to see any purpose in the scattered offensive other than a desire for easy booty, a sop to the moody troops. Even then, success was limited.

  Dissatisfaction in Rome made way for Scipio. He had re­turned to Italy to stand for election as aedile; he found himself suddenly within grasp of the consulship. Stories of his martial daring; laudatory letters from soldiers in Africa; the presence of Himilco Phameas in his party - the only glimpse of success so far afforded Rome -, all contributed to a growing conviction that if anyone could bring operations to a speedy conclusion it was Scipio.

  When the one objection to his nomination for consul - the fact that he was still six years below the legal age - was dis­creetly waived, popularity and propaganda did the rest. By direct vote of the people, Scipio was awarded command in Africa not only for 147 but, at least by implication, for as long as necessary to raze Carthage.

  Embarking reinforcements, the young general sailed for Africa with a personal friend, Laelius, as his legate, and an entourage reflecting his taste for Greek culture in the persons of his trusted mentor Polybius and the Stoic philosopher Panaetius. It was spring. The red cliffs at Sidi Bou Said stood out vividly from the sea. Carthage, the 'ship at anchor,' lay grandly, defiantly beside her temple-capped citadel.

  Scipio returned to the front at a critical moment for the legate Mancinus, who had celebrated the last days of his office with a belated assault on the northern suburbs. Appian, fol­lowing Polybius, makes this a reckless venture rescued from disaster by Scipio. Other sources, notably Livy, credit Mancinus with some success. At all events, he had run into difficulty and was evacuated from a tricky cliff-top position, perhaps near Cape Gammart.

  Recalling the second army of Piso from the country, Scipio set himself to restore discipline to a debased force.

  The camp was cleared of all ineffectives, particularly the profiteers who had spawned in large numbers over two years. All superfluous goods were to be sold under supervision by a given date. In a pep-talk to his soldiers, the new commander made it clear that they would be rewarded - but not until victory had been secured.

  While Scipio revitalized his army, the Carthaginians took steps to meet a heightened offensive. Of these, the most im­portant was perhaps the transfer of Hasdrubal from Nepheris to assume command of the city's defence. A coarse type of officer, florid, pot-bellied, domineering - in many ways the antithesis of Scipio the Punic general was by no means universally popular. He had, however, handled his modest forces with skill against the Romans, and his fire and re­solution were formidable.

  The Nepheris command now passed to a captain named Diogenes, seemingly a Greek mercenary, while one Bytheas led the cavalry once under Himilco. What proportion of the interior force accompanied Hasdrubal to Carthage is unclear, but 6,000 men were established with the general in a post on the isthmus, close to the triple fortifications.

  Hasdrubal's first problem was the sheer expanse of the front. With nothing like the garrison required to man all sec­tors of the ramparts, his only hope of holding the outer walls of the city was by means of mobile units forewarned of hostile movements. So far, the clumsy assaults of the consuls had allowed the citizens either to mass in advance on the threat­ened bulwarks, or at least time to limit penetration.

  Scipio quickly pointed the need for a new strategy.

  In a swift attack on two portions of the wall beside the northern gulf (Sebka er Riana), he succeeded in entering the rural quarter of the Megara with 4,000 troops. That he was forced to withdraw with no more luck than Mancinus had met earlier was due mainly to the density of orchards, olive groves and irrigation channels in the area - features greatly impeding his heavy infantry. Both sides made new plans. While Hasdrubal withdrew his forward post, Scipio, apprised of the unfavourable nature of the Megara - a gift to light defensive groups -, switched his thoughts to the south, and the precedent of Censorinus. One way or another, the defences of the inner city had to be over­come. He resolved to take the Byrsa and harbours by direct assault.

  Before he could safely concentrate on this sector, the isthmus had to be sealed against the influx of supplies to Carthage, and diversionary movements by her forces. To this end, the Romans spent the next few weeks on an extraordinary piece of military engineering: a screen of fortifications cover­
ing the entire front of the land wall. These works, found in part by modern archeologists, were described in detail by Polybius.

  Two parallel trenches were dug from shore to shore across the isthmus and joined near the water on either side by two more, completing a quadrilateral. Then the mounds from the trenches were palisaded - on the section facing Carthage, to a height of twelve feet. On the same side was built a series of observation towers, the central of which had a wooden super­structure of four storeys. Loftier even than the nearby city rampart, this post offered a clear view of the Megara.

  The whole undertaking, completed in the face of repeated Punic sallies, engaged the Roman army day and night for twenty days. The result was a fortified enclave blocking Carth­age from the mainland, defensible by a fraction of Scipio's total force. Combined with a sea blockade by the Roman fleet, its effect on the city was grimly claustrophobic. The siege was now in earnest.